Article Summary (Model: gpt-5.6-sol)
Subject: ChatGPT’s Cross-Site Identifier
The Gist:
The article reports that OpenAI’s advertising system creates a year-long __obi cookie that can be tied to a ChatGPT account or stable anonymous device identity. When participating advertiser sites load OpenAI’s pixel or SDK, browsers may send that cookie alongside page and conversion data, potentially letting OpenAI associate off-site activity with a ChatGPT identity. The author reproduced the mechanism on Chrome for Android but did not directly observe the final server-side account join.
Key Claims/Facts:
- Cross-site linkage: ChatGPT obtains a signed token linking an account subject to
obi, then sets__obiwithSameSite=None, allowing it on third-party requests. - Collected context: Advertiser pixels can transmit paths, conversion events, hashed contact details, and some clear-text location fields; the SDK may extract data from forms, page text, and tag-manager layers.
- Consent concern: OpenAI labels
__obian analytics cookie, and observed tokens used analytics consent even when marketing is a separate choice; OpenAI did not answer the author’s questions about this classification.
Discussion Summary (Model: gpt-5.6-sol)
Consensus: Skeptical and alarmed: most commenters view this as familiar adtech surveillance made more troubling by the intimate context of AI conversations, though some dispute its novelty or the article’s presentation (c49777671, c49778146, c49777650).
Top Critiques & Pushback:
Better Alternatives / Prior Art:
Expert Context:
__obipath described, but commenters note that clicks, device fingerprints, and network identifiers provide less exact alternative matching routes (c49779868, c49780659, c49784627).